WHAT POETS DO: TIBULLUS ON "EASY" HANDS

DAVID WRAY

The Greeks named him Poet, which name has, as the most excellent, gone through other languages. It comes of this word poiein, *which is to make, wherein (I know not whether by luck or wisdom) we Englishmen have met with the Greeks in calling him a Maker.*
Sir Philip Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry*

TIBULLUS IS NOT AN easy poet. Much of his difficulty lies in the fact that his difficulties tend to lie hidden. Yet, for all the ceramically smooth "simplicity" of its surface, the "terse and elegant" diction of Tibullan elegy does have intelligent, richly complex poetic pleasure to offer.[1] What the poetry demands of a reader in return, at the level of diction, is a patient and passionate interest in the linguistic stuff poems are made of. Knowledgeable ancient readers could presumably meet that demand, or approach it, by reading slowly enough, carefully enough, and imaginatively enough. For us, in a world where no one has a native speaker's access to Tibullus' language(s), the "art of reading slowly," even when sustained by constant resort to lexical aids, has often left readers with the impression of a poetic production better described as disappointingly thin than elegantly slender.[2] Readerly hunger, like other kinds, has a way of eroding hope, and Tibullan criticism is no stranger to the desperate measure or the counsel of despair.

The critical approach of reading for difficulty is beset by two separate problems in Tibullus' case.[3] There is first of all the problem of finding the difficulties instead of reading right past them. And when once a turn of language has been identified as difficult, the second problem arises at the point where we begin to suspect we may have exhausted the ordinary avenues for its interpretation: we have tended to stop too soon. The twentieth-century reception of Tibullus made it all too easy for critics to be satisfied with explaining away whatever looks disjunctive, discontinuous, or illogical in these poems as mere effects of a poet's free-flowing, oscillating, "hypersubjunctive" dreaminess.[4]

1. *Tersus atque elegans:* Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.93; and see Elder 1962; and Cairns 1979, 3–4. On Tibullan "simplicity": Putnam 1970; and Cairns 1979, 18–19.

2. "Reading slowly": Watkins (1990) attributes this definition of philology to Roman Jakobson.

3. On reading and difficulty: Adams 1991; and Touponce 1991.

4. "Hypersubjunctive" (*Überkonjunktiv*) is a term coined by Wimmel (1976, 32) to describe Tibullus' *indicatives,* the idea being that even when he uses the grammatical form of constatation he is still only wishing and dreaming. On Tibullus' subjunctives, Bright 1978, 130.

Classical Philology 98 (2003): 217–50
 0009-837X/03/9803-0002$10.00

1. WHAT TIBULLUS DOES

Consider the verses that open the first elegy of Tibullus' first book (1.1–8):

Divitias alius fulvo sibi congerat auro
et teneat culti iugera magna soli,
quem labor adsiduus vicino terreat hoste,
Martia cui somnos classica pulsa fugent:
me mea paupertas vita traducat inerti,
dum meus adsiduo luceat igne focus.
ipse seram teneras maturo tempore vites
rusticus et facili grandia poma manu

Let someone else gather himself wealth in a heap of tawny gold
and hold title to wide acres of cultivated land,
someone whom constant "work" (*labor*) terrifies, with the enemy at hand,
someone whose slumbers the martial trumpet, blasted, puts to flight:
as for me, let my poverty lead me along the "inactive" (*iners*) life,
provided that my hearth glows with a constant fire.
I'll sow the tender vines myself, when the time is ripe—
being a country dweller—and fat fruits too, with an "easy" (*facilis*) hand. . .

Have we really read too quickly over what is difficult in these lines? Stopped too soon in the search for resolution of the difficulties we have seen? Neither would seem to be the case at first glance. Most modern readers find on reaching the fourth couplet that the speaker's sudden burst of enthusiasm for agrarian industry, evidently so boundless as to make the work of his hands flow with preternatural "ease," jars harshly after the apparent work-shirking sentiments—"labor" an object of fright, poverty with "inaction" a fair and desirable bargain—of the first three couplets. And some editors, so far from stopping short of a solution, have chosen to emend the text by transferring four later couplets in the poem (25–32) to the place between the third couplet and the offending fourth. On this reading, the speaker now passes by degrees, and with considerable psychological verisimilitude, from the thought of a constant hearth fire (5–6) to that of being a poor but happy homebody (25–26), to relaxing in the shade by a stream (27–28), to consenting from time to time to pick up a hoe or a goad (29–30), to taking responsibility for his flock (31–32), and finally to the honest hard work of plantation and harvest (7–8).[5]

Not every editor of Tibullus has accepted this ingenious solution.[6] But the received text does give such oddly contradictory sense on the standard reading of the Latin that a critic explicating it might feel hard pressed to avoid invoking something like the psychic processes of dreams. Scholars of earlier generations regularly discerned *Träumerei* here as elsewhere in Tibullus, and they responded to it variously with outrage, condescension, even medical

5. This is Richter's transposition, adopted and defended by Murgatroyd (1980, 298). Other emendations have been proposed as well; see Ball 1983, 20–24.

6. Putnam (1973), for example.

diagnosis.[7] More recently, Paul Allen Miller has brought to bear on these difficult verses and on Tibullan elegy in general a new approach, based once again on dreams. His contribution is too important, and too demonstrative of what is at stake in how we currently read and evaluate Roman poetry, not to be addressed here at the outset. For Miller, "moments of contradiction in the text of Tibullus are best treated as symptoms that point to the traumatic eruption of what Lacan labels the "Real" and Jameson calls "History" into the ordered realm of language and the Symbolic."[8] Tibullus' "complex, multivoiced dream texts" are symptomatic, that is, of "the changing realm of the Real in post-civil-war Rome" and of the subject's inability "to process the experiential traumas that the world of History and the Real has inflicted" upon it. Like dreams the poems are often incoherent, because they are expressing what waking language, the realm of Lacan's Symbolic, cannot or must not say. And like dreams they are to be interpreted not so much by linear reading as by analysis, for "it is in Tibullus' mute gesture to this *beyond of signification,* to what Foucault labels the stutter of language, that his elegies discover their profundity." As Miller's concluding sentence puts it, "the dream . . . becomes the sole medium able to achieve a momentary and longed-for coherence, even as its status as wish-fulfillment insures that in reality it can only be the most insubstantial, utopian articulation of the desire to escape History's nightmare."[9]

There is an undeniable heroic brilliance in this bid to transform precisely the seemingly incoherent, self-contradictory "dreaminess" that plagued Tibullus' twentieth-century reception into a quality that enables critical thinking. There is an undeniable rightness as well in its insistence on the affinity between what poets do and what sleepers do. No accident that, for example, both English and Latin poetry traditionally locate their origins in the story of a "father of poetry" (Caedmon, Ennius) receiving his poetic vocation in a dream. Poems, ancient ones included, do have depth as well as surface, and, to borrow some terms from twentieth-century modernism, we need expressivist modes of reading them as well as objectivist ones. On each rereading of "The Tibullan Dream Text," I find new reasons to admire its author as a reader of poetry and a fellow champion of Tibullus, that absurdly undervalued Roman poet. I also find new reasons to fear that the reading models Miller has culled from recent critical theory ultimately work against his own readerly strength and work to domesticate both Tibullus' poetry and its historical and cultural contexts.

In the two decades since the publication of Fredric Jameson's *The Political Unconscious,* a great deal of academic critical writing in literary and cultural studies has presumed an identity between the aesthetic and "an essentialist

7. Van Wageningen (1913) went so far as to attribute Tibullus' "sogennante Träumereien" to a mental disorder. Later twentieth-century critics who continued to speak of "dreaminess" include Riposati (1945, 13) and Elder (1962, 82).

8. Miller 1999, 182, where the Real is defined as "that which always eludes any given construction of reality." Lacan's theory assigns ordinary "reality" to the realm of the Symbolic.

9. Miller 1999, 221.

or transcendental ideology of literary-cultural value whose Other," whose sworn enemy, is "the critical attempt to engage the material, social, and historical from a political, interventionist standpoint."[10] On this now familiar model, criticism proceeds and succeeds in one way alone: by a triumphantly cool process of demystification (deaestheticization) of the aesthetic object under the critical lamp, through exposure of its ideological deformation, its incoherence, its failure. Robert Kaufman has recently suggested that we have gotten the Marxian critical theory tradition exactly wrong (and even somewhat misread Jameson) on this point.[11] Along the Marx-Jameson axis of Miller's theoretical underpinnings, there are strong internal reasons to resist the thesis that Tibullus or any other artist could aesthetically engage political upheaval and historical change only through mute gesticulation toward a "real" but unspeakable something. Along the Freud-Lacan axis, a case from within could likewise be made against positing the Real as present in poetry only as unsignifiable trauma. One might point, for example, to the relation between "the Thing" (defined as "of the Real") and the work of art at various stages of Lacan's thought, or one might argue in a broader way from Lacan's own frequent recourse to poetic texts, his close connections to surrealism, and his choice to write a prose that reflects certain aspects of modernist poetic practice.[12]

This latter case, however, is one that Miller's actual use of psychoanalytic criticism never really asks us to mount. If Tibullus' poetry touched historical and political realities anywhere, it did so in the poet's relation to his prominent friend (Roman poets didn't say "patron") Valerius Messalla Corvinus.[13] And Miller's reading of that relation in the poetry, for all its instructively edgy invocation of the Lacanian Symbolic and Imaginary as imbricated modes of binary opposition and dyadic identification between the two men, ultimately relaxes back into a surprisingly classical Freudian narrative. With Messalla cast simply as "father figure" to a young poet, all the complexities of Messalla's (and therefore of Tibullus') political situation after Actium, and all the aristocratic interpersonal politics whose gift economy we see rather clearly reflected in Tibullus' poetic addresses to his *magnus amicus,* are effectively elided, dissolved into the oedipal.[14] Here we are close to the rea-

10. Jameson 1981; Kaufman 2000, 682.

11. Kaufman 2000, 684: "Marxian traditions proceed at key moments—*pace* today's critique of aesthetic ideology—on the presumption that *the aesthetic* is anti-aesthetic*ist* and that the aesthetic's anti-aestheticizing propensity enables, among other things, the thinking of history and historicization themselves, the very ability to posit, however provisionally, the sort of 'transhistorical imperative' that Jameson understandably associates with dialectical thought (and that knows its analogues in deconstructively conceived imperatives to think Otherness)."

12. Lacan's relation to surrealism: Krauss 1993, 71–72; Roudinesco 1997, 31 and passim; Tiffany 2000, 82–84.

13. On Roman poets and patronage: Saller 1982; Gold 1987; White 1993.

14. "Father figure": Miller (1999, 213), citing an ironized and qualified remark by W. R. Johnson (1990, 96), who in turn cites the classic work of "new humanist" Freudianism, Erikson 1958. Miller downplays the political nowhere more agressively than in his treatment of Poem 1.7, a birthday poem to Messalla that arguably assimilates the birthday boy to Osiris (Bright 1978, 60–65; Cairns 1979, 130–31, also 43–44, suggesting that Tibullus assimilates Messalla to Alexander as well; Koenen [1976, 154] argues contra that Tibullus is immortalizing not Messalla but, more harmlessly, Messalla's *genius*). Characterized by Miller merely as a "culture hero" (p. 215), Osiris was the god to whom the Ptolemies were assimilated as Egyptian pharaohs

son why some of the most conservative literary critics of the middle twentieth century, readers of a very different sort from Miller, found a certain version of Freudianism so useful. If you read literature through *that* lens, then whatever thing might have been historically and politically "of the Real" in the text will in practice have always already been reduced to the merely symptomatic by the time it strikes your eye.

Reading practice is where my present concern lies. Given the stakes set and the rewards offered by his critical model, and given his impressive strength as a warmly expressivist critic, it is all but inevitable that when Miller encounters an instance of what I am calling "difficulty" in Tibullus' poetry, he is more focused on sounding its depth, "exfoliating" it, promoting it to the status of an *aporia* or "interpretive dilemma," than on searching for interpretations that might resolve it into a discursively intelligible poetic utterance. In the first elegy's opening verses, accordingly, Miller finds a "simultaneous combination of opposition and concord" whose irreducibly rich ironic paradoxes—a rich man's life more "laborious" than a poor one's, agrarian toil making for an "inactive life," and the hands engaged in it called "easy" (do the hands thus stand for the work, by metonymy, or is it that *facilis* here means "skillful"?)—he skillfully frets into a "complex whole whose multiple layers of meaning vastly outweigh the sum of its parts, while at the same time remaining structurally anchored to the particularities of history understood in their deepest sense."[15] There is much to study with admiration here, not least a strong critic's salutary willingness to turn quietly traitorous to his announced theoretical orientations in favor of older and perhaps deeper allegiances like romantic organicism and New Critical irony and paradox.

From this virtuosic unpacking of Tibullan complexity that refuses to flatten and reduce, and even warns that attempts to do so in the case of the adjective *facilis* are "doomed to failure," I come away edified, in many particulars persuaded, confirmed in the conviction that there is more in Tibullus than a first or fifth reading reveals, and yet the old readerly hunger still chides.[16] Complexity does sometimes give, of itself, a powerful aesthetic experience of the critically enabling kind. That was one of the lessons of modernism (it may turn out that modernism learned it from romanticism), and for over half a century now scholars have been showing us its special applicability to Hellenistic and Roman poetry. But even the most fiendish dictional complexity in a poetic text still may encode a beckoning to the reader, an invitation to construe with vigilant interest toward discursive sense, as the experience of reading modern poetry in English often reminds us. Sometimes it takes living with the poem for months or years, as the poet did (Pound's *Cantos,* Cinna's lost *Zmyrna*). Often it takes research or resort to critical comment (modern readers of Pound have Guy Davenport, Carroll Terrell, and others; Roman

---

(Selden 1998, 337–39). A reader so inclined *could* take Tibullus' gesture as a political provocation, launched in direct competition with Virgil's divinization of Augustus at *G.* 1.24–42, but stated under a poetic veil that preserved the poet's full "deniability."

15. Miller 1999, 204.

16. Ibid.

readers of Cinna apparently could turn to someone called Crassicius Pansa).[17] But more often than not, the poetry strong enough to rouse that kind of appetite also eventually feeds it, and in ways that do not reduce but rather enhance the experience of subsequent readings. Some modern poems, it is true, possess a density that seems only to summon toward ever deeper levels of unreadability. But if any Hellenistic or Roman poetry ever had that effect on its contemporary readers, I can see no evidence of it. And I have been proved wrong too often by the poetry of my own language to trust my own readerly competence to pass a judgment of discursive incoherence on a poetic utterance in a dead tongue.

I believe these three difficulties in the opening of Tibullus' first poetry book—*labor, vita iners,* and *facilis manus*—do admit solutions that give both discursive sense and poetic interest. Getting to the solutions, as the words themselves seem to hint, takes work, especially in the case of the "easy" hands that give this essay its title. All three difficulties, however, are closely interrelated. "Work" and "inaction" come first.

2. HARD WORK

Latin *labor,* at every period of the language, had a wider semantic nexus than the American word that looks identical to it.[18] When a shipwreck victim in Plautus, for example, complains of her *labor,* she is describing an experience that speakers of English might call a hard day but not, except to make a witticism, a hard day's work.[19] The Latin word denoted passively endured hardship as well as actively productive effort, and of Tibullus' four uses of it in subsequent poems, two refer unambiguously to *labor* suffered not done.[20]

Duncan Kennedy has observed that the speaker's point of view in the passage under study seems to be not that of the pastoral/agrarian/erotic life to which he announces his flight but rather, naturally enough, the one from which he is defecting: a soldier's.[21] Late Republican Latin usage suggests that soldierly "labor," *labor militaris,* meant something like the psychological stress of regular confrontation with the danger of death; a man sluggish in that kind of *labor* was called not lazy but *timidus,* "fearful."[22] Cato's famous claim that farmers made "the bravest men and the sturdiest (*strenuissimi*) soldiers" was made in the context of an encomium on agriculture.[23]

17. Suet. *Gram.* 18.

18. But etymologically, of course, isn't: our *pudeur* or pragmatism canceled out the French vowel deformation to make the English word look directly derived from Latin.

19. Plaut. *Rud.* 191.

20. At 1.2.33 the lover's endurance of inclement weather at the beloved's door, at 1.4.47 the hardships suffered by a man chasing a boy. The other two uses describe active labor: at 1.7.39 the farmer's toil assuaged by Bacchus, at 2.1.63 women's textile arts.

21. Kennedy 1993, 15–20; noted by Miller 1999, 200.

22. Cicero in his letters uses the expression *timidus in labore militari*: *Fam.* 7.16.3, 17.1, cited in Lee 1974, 99.

23. Cato *Agr.* 1.1. On Cato's *rusticus* and Tibullus', see Leach 1980a, 86; Lyne 1980, 153; and Lee-Stecum 1998, 31.

But Julius Caesar, writing instead from the military viewpoint, suggests a different semantic context in which *labor* and agriculture could actually be thought of as mutually exclusive spheres of human existence (*B Gall.* 6.21–22):

> vita omnis in venationibus atque in studiis rei militaris consistit: ab parvulis labori ac duritiae student. . . . agriculturae non student. . . . neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios; sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire cogunt. Eius rei multas adferunt causas: ne adsidua consuetudine capti studium belli gerendi agricultura commutent. . . .
>
> Their entire existence consists in hunting and the pursuits of military life: from early childhood they pursue *labor* and toughness. . . . Agriculture they do not pursue. . . . Nor does anyone have a fixed area or privately owned parcel of land; instead, their magistrates and chieftains allocate land on a yearly basis, in an amount and in a place of their determining, to the tribes and families assembled together, and they compel them to change places from one year to the next. They give many reasons for this practice: first, to prevent people from being captivated by constant habit and trading in the pursuit of waging war for farming. . . .

When Caesar writes about Germans, it is hard to distinguish eyewitness or secondhand report from the familiar ethnographical commonplace of hypermasculine barbarians held up as a foil to effete, hypercivilized Romans.[24] In any event Caesar is writing for a Roman readership, and what he says here about *labor* and the relation between farming and soldiery is highly instructive. *Labor,* glossed as "toughness" (*duritia*), encompasses the activities of hunting and warfare, potentially gainful but life-threatening endeavors whose accomplishment depends not so much on industry as on "manly" bravery. These the Germans "pursue," with zeal. Agriculture lies outside the realm of this specific kind of *labor.* The Germans do not "pursue" farming. They farm only because they must, and they reshuffle the land assignments annually to block the formation of individual affective ties to particular parcels. The allure of "going agrarian," it seems, represents a positive danger against which career soldiers must be vigilantly protected. For when a soldier has begun to think his battle luck may be running out, the farmer's life visits his imagination not as a daily grind of hard work but rather as a seductive temptation by which it is only too easy to be taken in (Caesar's *capti*) and led astray (Tibullus' *traducat,* at 1.1.5).[25] This is precisely what has happened to the Tibullan speaker. He is eager to avoid not work but the risk of violent death, even if it means giving up the chance to enrich himself through plunder (1.1.75–77):

> vos, signa tubaeque
> ite procul, cupidis vulnera ferte viris,
> ferte et opes

24. On Caesar as an ethnographer: Tierney 1960; Nash 1976; and Rawlings 1998.
25. On the military sense of *traducere* in this context: Lee 1974, 107.

You standards and trumpets
go far away from me: take wounds to greedy men,
and take them riches too.

The soldier's *labor adsiduus* (1.1.3), then, is something other than the constant activity of "work": his life has no regular work routine and includes periods of physical inaction.[26] Rather, military *labor* consists in the constant endurance of physical, and perhaps especially mental, hardship. It is in this specialized military sense that the Tibullan speaker can describe *labor* as something terrifying, associated with fitful sleep, sudden trumpet alarms, and the constant underlying stress of the thought that the enemy is near. And in this sense, there is no contradiction whatsoever between the speaker's desire to escape (soldierly) *labor* once for all and his willingness, announced four verses later, to labor as a farmer in the field.

The second difficulty resembles the first. That Tibullus means by the phrase *vita . . . inerti* (1.1.5) something other than merely a "life of inaction" begins to emerge from an examination of his two other uses of the word *iners* in this poem (1.1.57–58, 71–72):

non ego laudari curo, mea Delia; tecum
dum modo sim, quaeso segnis inersque vocer.

I have no concern for being praised, my Delia; so long
as I'm with you, please, let me be called sluggish and *iners*.

iam subrepet iners aetas, nec amare decebit,
dicere nec cano blanditias capite

Soon enough *iners* age will come creeping up, and being a lover,
talking sweet, will simply no longer do when the head's all grey.

In the second of these passages, with its reminiscence of Mimnermus on the disadvantages of growing old, *iners* is applied figuratively to old age in the context of an extended trope on "love's soldiery" (*militia amoris*).[27] A word like "inactive" renders *iners* in this context passably, but not much better than passably. Clearly the Tibullan speaker has in mind here the "unmanning" physiological effects of old age.[28] Once again Julius Caesar on the Germans has light to shed. Interestingly, this passage contains the only occurrence of the word *iners* in the *commentarii,* and even here Caesar imputes it not to himself but to his hypermanly Germans (*B Gall.* 4.2):

equestribus proeliis saepe ex equis desiliunt ac pedibus proeliantur, equos eodem remanere vestigio adsuefecerunt, ad quos se celeriter, cum usus est, recipiunt: neque eorum moribus turpius quicquam aut inertius habetur quam ephippiis uti. itaque ad quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis pauci adire audent. vinum omnino ad se importari non patiuntur, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur.

26. On the role of *labor* as part of Roman *disciplina militaris* viewed as a "technology of masculinity," see Phang 2003.

27. See Murgatroyd 1980; and Smith 1913 ad loc.; also Murgatroyd 1975.

28. Leach 1980b, 60–61; Lee 1982, 109; Boyd 1984, 277; Miller 1999, 211.

> In cavalry actions they often jump off their horses and fight on foot. They have their horses trained to stay in the same place, and when necessary they beat a quick retreat back to them. Further, in their tradition nothing is held to be more base or more *iners* than making use of horse blankets. In consequence, they make bold to advance on an enemy mounted with horse blankets, no matter how great the number of these, and no matter how small their own number. They do not allow wine to be imported to them at all. They believe it makes men soft for enduring *labor* and effeminate.

"Manhood" is of course the whole point of Caesar's remarks. When Germans confront a cavalry force that greatly outnumbers them, but decide to advance anyway after observing the soft cushion placed beneath each rider's tender backside, what conclusion, precisely, have the Germans reached about the men they now boldly attack? Not merely that the horsemen are "lazy" or "inactive," "unskilled in battle," or even necessarily "lacking in spirit or enterprise" (all dictionary definitions of Latin *iners*), but more sweepingly that they are no men at all. And since they are no men at all, Caesar's Germans reason (in Latin), they will surely turn and flee if attacked vigorously even by a smaller force, because they lack the *virtus* (courage/"manhood") that makes a man willing to endure the ultimate soldierly *labor* of standing ground and fighting an enemy who for his own part is willing to fight to the death.

After the three occurrences in Poem 1.1, Tibullus uses a form of the word *iners* only once more, in the immediately following elegy. Here the sense is unambiguously that of a cowardly unwillingness to incur the risk of physical harm, and nothing to do with "laziness" or "inaction." The context is a discussion of the techniques, and also the ethical virtues, that lovers must possess for the successful accomplishment of the late night tryst. *Audendum est!* ("You have to show some daring!"), the passage begins, *fortes adiuvat ipsa Venus* ("Venus herself aids the brave").[29] After a description of some amorous covert operations, we read (1.2.23–24):

> nec docet hoc omnes, sed quos nec inertia tardat
> nec vetat obscura surgere nocte timor.
>
> And she [Venus] doesn't teach this to everyone,
> but only to those whom *inertia* does not hold back,
> whom fear does not forbid to rise up in the dark of night.

The speaker goes on to describe first his (justified) anxiety at the thought of being ambushed by bandits while walking alone in the street at night, and then the special protection he counts on from Love's divinity. A Roman man on an errand of love ran an appreciably direr risk than other midnight travelers. If the recipient of his visit was a freeborn Roman citizen, then he was guilty of committing or attempting *stuprum*.[30] Never mind the bandits: a *stuprator* caught in the act by a husband or father might be gang-raped by the house slaves, beaten, castrated, even killed on the spot.[31] *Militia amoris* was

29. Tib. 1.2.15: bravery is enjoined here on Delia, and later on the young man in love as well.

30. Tibullus coyly keeps Delia's status ambiguous until 1.6.69, where he reveals that she wears no *stola* and is thus no matron.

31. See Val. Max. 6.1; and Fantham 1991.

not quite so purely figurative a figure as it has often looked to modern eyes. And it is in this sense that a lover's *inertia* could consist in precisely the same thing as a soldier's: the ethical vice of cowardice.[32]

In the specialized context of military manhood, then, just as in their unmarked contexts, *labor* and *inertia* are opposites. But when the talk is of soldiery, they denote not physical activity and its contrary but rather the ethical attributes of "manly" bravery and "unmanly" cowardice. Upon reading of the "enemy at hand" and the "martial trumpet" of Tibullus' opening lines, a native Latin speaker might well have proceeded without appreciable "hermeneutic delay" to this ethical sense of the speaker's rejection of *labor* and defection to a *vita iners*.[33] What the Tibullan speaker is flouting on this interpretation is not a distaste for manual labor soon to be belied by a farmer's newfound work ethic, but rather the provocatively effeminate delicacy associated with the elegiac lover.

Both *labor* and *inertia* were of course as polyvalent as most other Latin words, and more than one sense of each is active in this passage. Tibullus was a poet in love with wordplay, and my claim is not to have exhausted his words' full meaning.[34] What I hope to have shown, rather, is that there existed a single coherent notional context, fully available to an ancient reader and clearly signaled in the opening words of Poem 1.1, in respect of which the act of passing from soldiery to farming could be characterized as a passage from *labor* to a *vita iners* without violating what modern Aristotelians call the "law of noncontradiction."[35] In consequence of this, nothing in the first four couplets of the poem book forces us to the grim choice between the desperate measure of repairing Tibullus' poetic utterance by textual emendation and the counsel of despair that invites us simply to diagnose the reasons (historical, psychological, or otherwise) why it looks broken. In this case at least, Tibullus' poetic utterance has begun to look sound after all.

The two proposed solutions that have led to this happy result (for a reader who accepts them) are simple, lexical ones. They are at the same time both dependent on something complex, namely the Graeco-Roman social construction of manhood. I suspect that it is in large part owing to this reason that neither solution has previously been advanced by a modern reader. Some earlier Tibullan critics may have found detailed discussion of these matters unseemly, but more important is the fact that, thanks to a number of remark-

32. Sen. *Ep.* 77.14–16 offers a striking example of *inertia* in the sense of an "unmanly" and "unmanning" cowardice having nothing to do with "laziness." A captured Spartan boy fatally dashes his brains out against a wall when his new master commands him to fetch and hold a chamber pot. (A slave who routinely performed this service for his master might of course also be put to the sexual service he was in position to render: on the sexual abuse of slaves by Roman masters, see Bradley 1994, 49–50.) "Would you not prefer that your own son die in this manner," Seneca asks Lucilius at the end of this vignette, "rather than reach old age by way of *inertia*?"

33. "Hermeneutic delay": Miller 1999, 204.

34. For example, as Cairns (1979, 5–6) has pointed out and as Miller (1999, 192) notes, *labor* in 1.1.2 probably carries something of the Hellenistic literary critical sense of "learned laboriousness."

35. Aristotle says "the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect" (*Metaph.* Δ 3.1005b23–24, revised Oxford trans.). In respect of (ethically neutral) physical exertion, then, both farming and soldiery possess the attribute of being *labor,* and neither possesses that of being a *vita iners*. But in respect of the ethics of soldierly manhood (*virtus*), *labor* is an attribute of soldiery not farming, and *vita iners* an attribute of farming not soldiery.

able contributions made in recent decades, we now have a deeper understanding of social interactions and gender constructions in the Graeco-Roman world.[36] That understanding, like everything new we learn about the ancient Mediterranean world, puts us in the way of becoming better readers of Greek and Roman poetry.

3. "EASY" HANDS

A third difficulty remains in the passage under study. The solution I have to offer is more complex than the first two. The difficulty is itself a more interesting one (1.1.7–8):

ipse seram teneras maturo tempore vites
rusticus et facili grandia poma manu

I'll sow the tender vines myself, when the time is ripe—
being a country dweller—and fat fruits too, with an "easy" [*facilis*] hand.

It should be said at once that not every reader has found an insurmountable difficulty in the epithet *facilis* applied to a farmer's hand. It should also be said that this is one of the places where I am most in debt to Miller's critical instincts and skill. Miller shows both how complex the difficulty is and how insufficient the solutions hitherto proposed for it have been. He also shows how much poetic work is accomplished by what he rightly calls an "exquisite" couplet.[37] Through a pair of metonymic displacements between sowing and harvest, the entire annual cycle of agricultural production is metaphorically condensed into two verses.[38] It is as though all of what farmers do, and time itself, had ripened to maturity in the poetic act of a single breath: the objects of the verb depicting the farmer's planting appear, as if by magic (or in a dream), in the form of ripe fruit rather than seed.[39] Miller sees the poetic dream logic of "wish fulfillment" at work in this, and rightly, at least in the sense that bounty at harvest time is the farmer's dearest wish at planting time. The lines that follow have Tibullus' speaker expressing precisely that wish, in the form of a prayer (1.1.9–10).

My own reading posits poetic logic of another kind here, but it is thanks to Miller that I have come to see that the difficulty remains unresolved until

36. Examples include Richlin 1992; Edwards 1993; Gleason 1995; and C. Williams 1999.

37. Miller 1999, p. 207, n. 26, citing Wimmel 1976, 32.

38. "Condensation" (*Verdichtung*) and "displacement" (*Verschiebung*) are names given by Freud (1958, 279–309 [orig. 1900]) to psychic processes occurring in dreams. (The first of these two terms shares a root with *Dichtung*, "poetry," as Hollander 1997, 79, points out.) Jakobson (1990 [orig. 1956]) drew the binary distinction between a metaphoric axis of similarity and a metaphoric axis of contiguity. Benveniste (1966 [orig. 1956]) observed that the Freudian unconscious had its own "rhetoric," onto which the traditional names of rhetorical figures could be mapped. It was Lacan (1977 [orig. 1966]) who, inspired by Benveniste's observation, famously mapped the Jakobsonian binarism onto the Freudian one. Empson (1966, 193 [orig. 1930]), however, long before Benveniste's essay, had already remarked that Freud's notion of "condensation" might be applied in explicating the kind of ambiguity (the seventh of Empson's seven types) that Miller finds in the opening of Poem 1.1: that of "contradiction" and "fundamental division."

39. And as Miller (1999, p. 203, n. 20) rightly argues, the attempted solution of pointing out that vines may be planted in the fall as well as the spring does not fully account for the complexity of Tibullus' expression. Even if a farmer is planting and harvesting in the same season, to speak of his "sowing fat fruits" is irreducibly figurative poetic language.

we find a sense of the word *facilis* that can contain the work, and the entire cycle, of agrarian production. The older solution of taking *facilis* in an unfigured sense to mean something like "ready" or "skilled" is simply too tidy, as Miller shows. When Roman hands are called *faciles,* in the active sense ("able to do/make"), they are usually being called artistically deft and nimble, as when Cynthia's *facilis . . . manus* plucks the lyre strings with wondrous art (Prop. 2.1.9). The manual labor of agriculture, conversely, requires not digital dexterity but strength, endurance, and hard calluses. Elsewhere Tibullus shows us how well he knows this, in an aristocratic boast that both self-reflexively flaunts the inadequacy of his own hands to the mean work of farming and simultaneously assures the reader that only cruel love, and the example of a god in love with a beautiful boy, could ever bring him to submit his delicate person to that labor's demeaning deformation (2.3.9–11):

nec quererer, quod sol graciles exureret artus,
  laederet et teneras pussula rupta manus.
pavit et Admeti tauros formosus Apollo

And I wouldn't complain of the sun's burning my slender limbs,
of a blister burst hurting my tender hands.
Even fair Apollo played shepherd to Admetus' bulls.

Why then has Tibullus chosen to open his first book by attributing "facility," whatever he means by it, to his own hands engaged in working the fields? The question does more than puzzle. It grates on modern moral sensibilities to read the word *facilis* (and the word *iners,* and an implication of the absence of *labor*) applied in any sense whatsoever to life on a farm. It grates so harshly as to distract us from asking how badly or well our reading may have grasped the sense of those words in their context. The sentiment of the entire passage is both alien and alienating to modern readers. Two separate but related issues have conspired to keep it that way.

First, the gesture on which Tibullus opens his first poetry collection, a book profoundly influenced by Virgil's *Eclogues,* is fundamentally a pastoral one.[40] And the dominant modern response to pastoral is still one of rejection on aesthetic, political, and moral grounds. Anglophone antipastoralism, a tradition that begins around the time of Samuel Johnson's condemnation of Milton's *Lycidas* (it is often backdated to Shakespeare's *As You Like It*) and finds perhaps its most nuanced expression to date in the Marxist criticism of Raymond Williams, is still very alive in academic as well as popular literary discourse.[41] Popularly, it has often held up the shopworn image of the last queen of France in her theme-park village at Versailles as illustrating what lies at the aesthetic and political heart of the idyllic "pastoral illusion" of the "happy shepherd." One way of responding to this view is to point out

40. On Tibullus and the influence of Virgil's *Eclogues*: Leach 1978; Bright 1978, 4; and W. R. Johnson 1990, 97.

41. S. Johnson 1983, 60: "[*Lycidas*'] form is that of a pastoral, easy, vulgar, and therefore disgusting; whatever images it can supply are long ago exhausted, and its inherent improbability always forces dissatisfaction on the mind"; R. Williams 1973; Alpers 1996, 71–80.

that the characters who people ancient pastoral, so far from enjoying an eternal Golden Age springtime, tell us lucidly, if we listen, that work hurts at least as much as love.[42] But modern antipathy to pastoral is both more fundamental than that and based, in the view of at least one modern critic, Paul Alpers, on a more fundamental misprision.

The formation of nearly every living English-speaking reader of poetry will have included at least some inculcation in critical models that emphasize the psychological and universal aspects of literature to the near exclusion of its rhetorical and social aspects. And criticism of this kind has for a long time, at least since Schiller, posited an "Edenic paradigm" as the essence of pastoral, taking its "idyllic" setting in a utopia or (more sympathetically) a "spiritual landscape" as the constitutive difference of pastoral from other literary modes.[43] The informing urge of pastoral, on this Edenic or Arcadian paradigm, can consist only in escapist flight to a bogus naïve simplicity, and pastoral literature can in consequence only appear (from the universalizing and psychologizing viewpoint) as weak, slight, and uninteresting.[44] Alpers has suggested instead that pastoral's central trope, its mode of knowledge, resides not in the pastoral landscape but rather in the pastoral characters whose lives and words emblematize our own, through "representative anecdotes."[45]

"The pastoral process," William Empson had taught us and Alpers reminds us, is a matter of "putting the complex into the simple." "In pastoral you take a limited life and pretend it is the full and normal one," and what gives the pastoral mode its representational adequacy is the fact that "you can say everything about complex people by a complete consideration of simple people."[46] The "completeness" of that consideration, as Alpers points out, is inevitably "a matter of literary representation and self-representation" (so too is the "simplicity" of pastoral characters), and if we are to find a way to read pastoral without condescension we should be careful not to exaggerate the claims we make for it. Taking pastoral seriously, for Alpers, must proceed by way of an ethics of reading that "relinquishes visionary heroism and identifies writing and its human significance with a fundamentally ironized mode."[47] Alongside the poetological trope of country people and their labors standing in as a "representative anecdote" about poets and theirs, this notion of a kind of poetry that possesses a modest, but still aesthetically and ethically adequate, representational "strength relative to world" lies at the center of Tibullus' own poetics, a poetics whose programmatic emblems in Poem 1.1 include *contentus vivere parvo* ("content to live on a little," 25) and, its closing device, *despiciam dites despiciamque famem* ("I'll look down on the

42. And Marvell's mower, to take a single modern example, does not gainsay Virgil's Corydon on this point.

43. Arcadia as a "spiritual landscape": Snell 1953, 281–309 (orig. 1945).

44. Miller (1999, 213–20) situates himself implicitly but firmly in the Schillerian model of pastoral: "idyll" is a way of saying "daydream," and "Golden Age" equals a nostalgically idealized image of childhood connected with Lacan's "mirror stage."

45. Alpers (1996, 13) takes this term from Burke 1969, 59.

46. Empson 1974, 115, 137, cited in Alpers 1996, 42–43.

47. Alpers 1996, 42, describing Empson's way of reading.

rich, and on hunger as well," 78).[48] Both these intertwined notions of pastoral poetry, as a poetological allegory of the poetic act and as an ethically adequate representation of human life, were known to Tibullus from his poetic tradition, and both have direct bearing on the Tibullan difficulty under consideration.

The second and broader issue that tends to alienate a modern reader of this poem from the outset has to do with the differences between ancient ethics and modern morality.[49] "Moral" is a term and a category that Tibullan critics have found useful, and the pedagogical conventions of literary criticism allow and even encourage us to use words of this kind without definition, as if on the assumption that, from century to century, we all know what morality is and where the sphere of its application lies. R. O. A. M. Lyne, for example, characterizes Tibullus as "re-deploying against the Roman establishment's thinking" its "own moral mythology."[50] Miller cites Lyne respectfully here, and with justice: this virtuoso flash of familiarizing pedagogy is at the same time a thought-provoking suggestion of one kind of relation between literature and politics. For his own part Miller draws an almost Rousseauvian dichotomy between the "moral" and the "pragmatic" in his explication of Poem 1.1, discerning such sentiments as an "opposition to wealth on moral grounds" on the part of its speaker.[51]

What these and similar manners of speaking mask is something that the critics who employ them know and would readily admit: modern moral notions depend historically, genealogically, on all the things that have made us modern. The easiest to name of these are Christianity, democracy, and capitalism, together with the various modern discourses that have critiqued all three. However much we emotivize morality through modernist relativism or deconstruct it through postmodernist cynicism, the category of the moral itself remains, for us, firmly in the nature of (to use the most embarrassing word for it) righteousness: a deontological imperative to "be good" by doing the good (because to do so is right), and a universal value in respect of which all human subjects share equal obligation and equal dignity. Ancient ethics, conversely, was teleological rather than deontological in its primary orientation, and it was above all eudaemonist: a thing that Kant, one of the chief theorizers of modern morality, found very hard to forgive even in the Stoics he so admired. Culturally embedded in an aristocratic organization of society, ancient ethics takes it as axiomatic that "good" is predicated of things insofar as they are aims or "ends," and that "happiness" or "the good life" is the highest good because it is the end for the sake of which every other end is pursued. Already present in Plato and based in some degree on the "popular morality" of the ancient Mediterranean, eudaemonist ethics was first fully

48. Implicit here is a possible avenue toward ethical reevaluation of something that many readers still find indigestible in much of the Greek and Roman poetry of this period: its "Callimachean aesthetics," as we tend to call it.

49. This is one, somewhat oversimplified, way of putting the difference; see B. Williams 1985; Annas 1992 and 1993; and Larmore 1996, 19–40, for nuanced pictures.

50. Lyne 1980, 155, cited in Miller 1999, 187.

51. Miller 1999, 184–85; cf. Lee-Stecum (1998), who speaks more than once of Tibullus' "definition of morality."

theorized by Aristotle. From him it passed into the major schools of Hellenistic philosophy, whose teachings occupied a central position in the cultural life of all educated persons in the Hellenistic Mediterranean at the time of Tibullus' writing.[52]

Let us make the experiment of putting the language of the "moral" to one side and trying to think about the opening verses of Poem 1.1 in ancient ethical terms. The poem's speaker, we can immediately say, is enacting what ancient philosophers called a προαίρεσις, an ethical deliberative choice.[53] And instead of saying, in modern terms, that the speaker is selecting on "moral" grounds between two ways of "making a living," we can say that the terms of the speaker's choice, the two ends (τέλη/*fines*) between whose competing claims to produce happiness he is making a selection, are the "arts" (τέχναι/*artes*) or "arts of life" (βίου τέχναι/*artes vivendi*) of soldiery and farming.[54] How might an ancient reader have defined these two arts and the difference between them?

It is on a question of this kind that Plato's *Sophist* begins. The Eleatic stranger initiates the search for a definition of the angler's art (a warm-up exercise for the more difficult task of defining the sophist's art) with the proposition that the human arts are divisible into two classes.[55] Arts of the first class bring into existence things that did not previously exist. Examples of these productive or "making" arts (ποιητική) include first of all farming and every kind of care of living beings, then the artisanal production of utensils by composition or fashioning, and finally the imitative arts. Arts of the second class produce nothing but instead employ coercion, through deeds or words, to acquire preexisting things. These acquisitive or "getting" arts (κτητική) include learning, moneymaking, fighting, and hunting.[56] Both farming and soldiery fall into these categories in ways that look very foreign indeed, even after we set aside the difference between ancient and modern definitions of art. We do not rank agrarian labor, artisanal production, and the mimetic "fine arts" together as species of a single genus. Nor, more significantly, do we regard the soldier's walk of life as fundamentally more acquisitive than a farmer's or an artisan's. This is so partly because capitalism guarantees a relation of interchangeable equivalence among all forms of gainful labor, and partly because the cause and effect relation between military conflict and booty is for modern readers, and for the modern soldier, largely an indirect and mystified one.

In the loudly proclaimed *ars vivendi* of Tibullus' first elegy, many modern readers have detected the encrypted presence of something that every ancient

52. On deontological morality versus teleological ethics, see Schneewind 1996, also MacIntyre 1981. Long 1996, 182–83, usefully summarizes the presence of eudaemonism in Plato. On philosophy in Roman intellectual life, Rawson 1985, 282–97. On the presence of Aristotle's philosophy in Rome of the first century B.C.E.: Barnes 1997.

53. The *Satires* and *Odes* of Tibullus' friend Horace open similarly on questions of *Lebenswahl* ("life choice").

54. What the speaker is choosing would thus correspond to the fourth *persona* in Cicero's four *persona* theory; see C. Gill 1988.

55. The proposition passes without dispute or question on Theaetetus' part and so seems to be taken as a common notion rather than a philosophical one.

56. Pl. *Soph.* 219a-c. Compare also Arist. *Pol.* 1.3.1256b23–24: "from one point of view, the art of war (πολεμική) is a natural art of acquisition (κτητική)."

reader, by convention, would have expected to find at the start of a poetry book: a statement of poetic program, an *ars poetica*.[57] And once we recontextualize the opening of Poem 1.1 in light of the ancient binarism spelled out above by Plato (and implicit in Aristotle and elsewhere) by which all human arts are divided into "poetic" arts that make and "ctetic" arts that get, the poetological allegory encoded in Tibullus' pastoral gesture of defection from soldiering to farming suddenly takes on the look of a richer, apter representation. The same could be said for the "pastoral illusion" itself. On the ancient view, what pastoral characters do is at the most fundamental level the same as what poets do: growing crops and tending flocks are "creative arts," properly not figuratively, and the artists who practice these "poetic" arts are properly called "makers."

In the sixteenth century, Sidney could write that speakers of English "have met with the Greeks in calling [the poet] a maker." For us the usage is archaic, though some of our poets still use it.[58] Latin, for its part, never called poets "makers" with a native word, but instead used the Greek loan word *poeta* as the ordinary, unmarked way of saying "poet." But Latin did regularly describe poetic composition with the native verb *facere* (equivalent to Greek ποιεῖν, "to make"), so that Catullus, for example, could make a bilingual *figura etymologica* by writing to his friend Calvus (in a poem that probably served as a cover letter to Catullus' transation of Sappho's Greek) the words *poema feci:* "I have 'poemed' a 'making' ": that is, "I have made a poem."[59] What I take Tibullus to be saying in Poem 1.1 when his speaker calls his hand *facilis* will be evident by now if the epigraph from Sidney did not make it so from the outset. By a calque on the Greek, the speaker is describing his own hand neither as deft and masterful, nor as performing its work with effortless ease, but rather as ποιητικός: "makerly" and so "poetic."

A number of linguistic and philological points can be advanced in favor of this suggestion.[60] First, Latin has no adjectival form derived from the verb *facere* other than *facilis* that suits the purpose of calquing on the Greek word. Next, there is at least one possible example of a morphologically analogous calque in Roman poetry of the same period. When Tibullus' friend Horace, opening his first book of epistles, writes *nunc agilis fio* ("now I become *active*," *Epist.* 1.1.16), in the Stoic sense of taking up one's duty to contribute to public life, at least one commentator has taken *agilis* (from *agere*) in this specialized sense (the far more common sense is close to English "agile") as representing a calque on the Greek πρακτικός (from πράττειν).[61] Further, while Miller is correct that *facilis* has the passive meaning "easy" (more literally "doable") far more often in Latin than an active meaning, the example of Propertius cited above (where a poetological sense is al-

57. Examples include Cairns 1979, 11–35; Leach 1978 and 1980a; Boyd 1984; Mutschler 1985, 28 and passim. On programmatic *Lebenswahl* in Tibullus and Propertius, see Steidle 1962.

58. See, for example, Frank Bidart's "Lament for the Makers" (2002), where "makers" are parents, but also poets.

59. Catull. 50.16. On this poem as a "cover letter" to the Sappho translation, Wray 2001, 97–98.

60. On *facilis* in the context of other Latin adjectives derived from verbs and ending in *-lis*, see Leumann (1917, 41–44), who argues that *facilis* was originally middle or reflexive rather than passive in meaning.

61. Morris 1967 ad Hor. *Epist.* 1.1.16.

most certainly present as well) shows how easily a native speaker could have taken the epithet in the active sense when applied to a hand.[62] Both Greek and Latin regularly imputed artisanal skill, an attribute of the artisan's soul, to the hand itself. Greek artisans took sobriquets like Χειρίσοφος ("Wise-hand"), and Tibullus says of Osiris that it was he who first "made the plow with his wise hand" (*primus aratra manu sollerti fecit Osiris,* 1.7.29).[63] Aristotle was theorizing a very widely held belief when he wrote "the soul . . . is like the hand; for the hand is a tool of tools."[64]

4. MAKINGS OF MAKING

Returning to Tibullus' couplet, and to the Lacanian/Freudian/Jakobsonian structural terms in which Miller has explicated the richness of its difficulty, I want to suggest that the poetological sense of *facilis* offers a solution that satisfies both terms of the structural opposition without impoverishing the complexity of their mutual tension. On the metaphoric axis of condensation, the speaker's hand possesses the quality of being *facilis* because it has turned from "getting" tawny (*fulvus*) gold through soldiery to the gentler art of "making" golden (*flavus*) grain through farming.[65] In light of this quality, we can now say why Tibullus has condensed the entire agrarian cycle of production into a single act. Farming is a "poetic" art, productive of the artifacts that are crops. To put the thing in Aristotle's terms, it is by virtue of the makerliness of the farmer's soul, a potentiality embodied in his ensouled hand and realized in his practice of the farmer's art (if nature and the gods are favorable), that the stuff of seeds and soil come to be fashioned into crops through a single continuous process of "making." Further, if on the metaphoric axis of condensation the epithet *facilis* is strangely apt for the speaker's hand, on the metonymic axis of displacement it is aptly strange, just as the self-aware "pastoral illusion" that makes poets into pastoral characters is itself both metaphorically apt and metonymically strange. The soldier-about-to-turn-farmer speaking to us on the page of the poem is at the same time a poet, in the literal sense. And a poet's hand, dextrous and tender, is fit for plucking lyre strings and writing poems, but not for stretching itself out to enclose and pluck ripe crops too big for its grasp, as the a-b-B-A arrangement of the words in the verse iconically shows it doing: *facili grandia poma manu* (1.1.8).

62. Propertius, in a series of clearly poetological images assimilating Cynthia to poetry and to his own poem book, writes: ". . . or if she plucks a song/poem of the lyre with her ivory fingers, I marvel how she plies with art her *faciles* hands" (*sive lyrae carmen digitis percussit eburnis, / miramur facilis ut premat arte manus,* 2.1.9–10). Cynthia, then, is the fashioned artifact of a "poem": her fingers are of ivory, and *miramur,* equivalent to Greek ἄγαμαι, perhaps likens her to a statue, an ἄγαλμα. But she is a fashioning artificer, a "poet," as well: she shapes a poem upon the lyre just as a potter shapes a pot on the wheel, by "pressing," with "makerly" hands. On *facilis* used more often in Latin in the active sense than the passive, Miller 1999, 203.

63. We know of at least two artisans who took or were given this name: a sculptor in Crete (sixth century B.C.E.) and a silversmith in Rome (first century C.E.): Burford 1972, 211.

64. Arist. *De an.* 3.8.432a1–2.

65. Tibullus seems to be marking the contrast between the organic yellow of grain and the inorganic yellow of gold: Lee-Stecum 1998, 36.

A poetic tradition is present intertextually in Tibullus' *facilis manus,* one that both strengthens and deepens the interpretation of the epithet proposed here. Tibullus was not the first poet to use *facilis* in the sense of "poetic." He found it in Virgil, who almost certainly originated the calque, though no modern reader seems to have noticed it. Virgil applied the epithet to a tool of manual art rather than a hand, in an explicitly poetological pastoral moment in the third *Eclogue.*[66] Two shepherds are about to compete in poetry. Each lays down the pledge of a prize gift. Against Damoetas' calf, Menalcas pledges a finer artifact: a matching pair of cups. Untouched by his own lips, kept out of use and exchange alike, these add up to a poem's worth of wealth and are themselves genuinely poetic productions. For just as the poet's art ecphrastically renders the carver's art for our admiration, so each cup's artifice allegorizes the artwork that is the poem (*Ecl.* 3.36–39):

pocula ponam
fagina, caelatum divini opus Alcimedontis,
lenta quibus torno facili superaddita vitis
diffusos hedera vestit pallente corymbos.

I'll put down cups,
beechen ones, the carved work of divine Alcimedon.
Raised in relief on their surface by the "easy" lathe, a creeping vine
is clothing berries scattered along pale ivy.

An "easy lathe" gives difficult sense. By the Greek loan word *tornus* (a lathe is called τόρνος because it turns), Virgil means the wood-carver's chisel, by metonymic substitution.[67] As for *facilis,* it has a reception story in this context that the reader will find strangely familiar: a nineteenth-century commentator explained that it "expresses the ease of perfect mastery," and the next century's commentators and literary translators followed suit.[68] Miller, though never mentioning the Virgilian passage, has taught us how to be suspicious of this "easy" interpretation. The work of carving designs in relief upon wood to represent layers of texture upon texture (like the work of finding a description of it in verse to enliven a reader's imagination) is painstaking, not easy, even for a master artisan. Then too, the standard interpretation makes for strange rhetoric in Menalcas' mouth. We expect him, in announcing his own pledge against Damoetas' calf, to highlight the intricate difficulty and aesthetic value of the decoration on the cups rather than the masterful ease with which the carver wrought it.

Virgil has even placed in his text a pair of clues pointing to the poetological calque. First, since the word that *facili* modifies is already Greek, only the epithet itself has to be retranslated to give ποιητικὸς τόρνος: the carver's chisel is poetic, properly and literally, by virtue of its power to "make," a

66. It is in this Virgilian poem as well that Tibullus most likely first encountered the name Delia (*Ecl.* 3.67), in a context where it remained unclear (to ancient readers) whether the name referred to a slave or a goddess: Clausen 1994 ad loc.

67. So Coleman 1977 ad loc.

68. Page 1895, cited by Clausen 1994 ad loc., who also cites for comparison the Tibullan passage under study.

power actualized in the mimetic visual renderings decorating the cup.[69] Second, Virgil gives the artisan of the cups an epithet that he applies elsewhere in the *Eclogues* only to poets.[70] Commentators know this, and they interpret *divinus* (literally "divine") in this sense as "inspired."[71] An unobjectionable translation, but one that I think points in the direction of the critical blindspot that has obscured Virgil's calque on *facilis,* the same blindspot that has tended to keep us from focusing on the broader implications of the fact that whenever an ancient poem ecphrastically mirrors an artifact, the artifact in turn, by a conceptual chiasmus, is allegorically mirroring the poem.[72] The critical models that until recently have dominated the Anglophone criticism of Roman poetry implicitly drew the brightest of lines between what poets do and what artisans do.[73] Poetry of "craft" (Hellenistic pastoral, for example) is scarcely poetry at all on this view, because poetry should be all about heroically anguished subjects (like poets), never about finely crafted objects (like poems), and the poet's "inspiration" is to be always and only of the kind that comes in prophetic visions and dreams.[74]

Graeco-Roman discourse drew the lines differently, as its languages reflect. When an artisan like Virgil's Alcimedon signed his work in Greek or Latin, he predicated of himself an act of poesis: the formula was Ἀλκιμέδων ἐποίησε or *fecit Alcimedon*. Precisely the same thing was said of poets: they "made" their poems. Poetry was thus, by its ecphrastic potentiality, a mimetic "making of making" (ποίησις ποιήσεως), just as the activity of contemplation, an attribute of divinity accessible to mortals, was defined by Aristotle as thinking thinking itself or "thinking of thinking" (νόησις νοήσεως).[75] The

69. Propertius would later use *tornus* in an unambiguously poetological sense, remembering and "correcting" Virgil, by making the word refer to what it describes properly (a lathe) rather than figuratively (a chisel): *incipe iam angusto versus includere torno* ("begin now to turn your verses on a narrow lathe," Prop. 2.34.43). Each of Menalcas' cups contains a portrait: one of Conon the astronomer, the other perhaps (Menalcas forgets the name) of the astronomical didactic poet Aratus (*Ecl.* 3.40–42, Clausen 1994 ad loc.). Of the poet's "forgotten" name it could be said, in Žižek's Lacanian terms, that it is the "Thing within the body" of the cup (Žižek 1991, 255), the "nothing" around which the cup is formed and which it signifies. The cup's two portraits, together with the Theocritean intertext (discussed below), point toward the poetological interpretation of the whole passage and toward the interpretation of *torno facili* as a poetological calque.

70. Note too that in the two verses *divini* is placed just above *facili*. Both words sit in the same metrical seat, directly after the penthemimeral caesura.

71. Coleman 1977 ad loc.

72. On this aspect of Hellenistic ecphrasis, and Theocritus' and Virgil's cups in particular, see Faber 1995. What I am calling "poetological mirroring" is a feature of Indo-European antiquity. Compare for example the poem on the wedding of Surya and Soma in the *Rig Veda* (10.85), where poetic meters themselves are featured as attendants of the bridal "chariot made of thought" (Doniger 1981, 268).

73. But a critic like Stewart (2002, 198) can compose the difference through a finely poised consideration of "the poetic in its two modes, first as sudden inspired creation and second as *technê,* the laborious considered making that proceeds from the interaction of mind and hand. Inspiration and *technê* already imply two different 'speeds' within which *poiêsis* emerges. But inspiration does not always precede *technê,* and *technê* can itself provide a source of inspiration as aspects of the material only come forward within the process of *poiêsis* itself."

74. To say this is not to suggest that other disciplines within the humanities have outstripped us Latinists. As Brown (2002, 464) remarks, "the story of the triumph of the Subject at the expense of objects" is "a story still manifest in literary criticism and cultural theory."

75. These Greek expressions are coinages of Seiler 1997, 156–57, who draws this connection between Hellenistic poetics and Aristotle's philosophy. "Thought thinking itself": Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 7.1072b20, and see Lear 1988, 293–320.

poem, as a signifier signifying itself (one of Lacan's definitions of the Thing) and so instantiating what Paul Zumthor has called the "circularity of song," presented an image of divinity, both by its "circularity" and by the traces of manufacture perceptible on its surface.[76] Here is a reason for calling a poet "divine" situated at some remove from the vernacularized romantic model that, invoking Plato (selectively), wants poetic "inspiration" to be visionary or not at all, and wants poets to look always like Blake or Éluard, never like Theocritus. But in Theocritus' (and Tibullus') Hellenistic context the more widespread view was the Peripatetic one that located the "divinity" of poetry in what poets do rather than in what they dream. Manufacture, the hand's making: "the soul is like the hand; for the hand is a tool of tools, and in the same way the mind is the form of forms, and sense (αἴσθησις) is the form of sensible things."[77]

We can push deeper into the epithet's tradition. Virgil's cups of course recall Theocritus' cup in *Idyll* 1 both contextually, by their status as gift objects put into exchange as the prize and price of a poem, and also intertextually, by the verbal description of the artwork around each circular lip. And though it is generally overshadowed by the more obvious points of verbal similarity, Virgil's *facilis tornus* in fact points to something specific in Theocritus' text. The goatherd in *Idyll* 1 opens his ecphrasis by promising Daphnis "a deep cup, washed over with sweet wax, double-handled, newly fashioned (νεοτευχές), still smelling from the carver's chisel (γλυφάνοιο)."[78] That is to say, the forming (*facilis*) work of the artisan's tool (*tornus*) has released the sweet smell of the artifact's matter. "Wood" is how you say "matter" in Greek and Latin (ὕλη/*materia*), and "sweet" (ἁδύ is the *idyll*'s first word, predicated of nature's song and the goatherd's art) is a philosophical term as well: the "pleasurable" is the Epicurean telos or highest good.[79] When, at the very end of Theocritus' *idyll,* the goatherd makes his gifts in exchange for Thyrsis' poem, he offers the cup to the poet (and the poem to the reader) with a synaesthetic invitation to delve, sensually, deep into the nothing around which the circular boundaries of a cup (or a poem) are fashioned, of stuff that still bears the trace of its maker's hand, and "see, friend, how good it smells" (θᾶσαι, φίλος, ὡς καλὸν ὄσδει).[80]

Virgil does not imitate Theocritus in this; he answers him. While Theocritus never identified the wood of the cup, Virgil invites you to "see how good it smells" in the stroke of a single word, a word probably of his own

76. "If it really is a signifier, and the first of such signifiers fashioned by human hand, it is in its signifying essence a signifier of nothing other than of signifying as such or, in other words, of no particular signified": Lacan 1997, 120, explicating "the Thing" through the same example Heidegger had used, a handcrafted ceramic pot. "Circularity of song": Zumthor 1982; compare also Moisseeff 1994, whose notion of "self-referring concept-artifacts" is cited in Godelier 1999, p. 236, n. 18.

77. Arist. *De an.* 3.8.432a1–3.

78. Theoc. 1.27–28.

79. On Epicureanism and Hellenistic pastoral, see Rosenmeyer 1969.

80. Theoc. 1.149. The "fragrance" of poetry is made into an even more explicitly poetological synaesthetic figure by Philodemus, in a phrase that bears comparison to Tibullus' *facilis manus.* His speaker asks Xantho to "strum some myrrh for me with your tender (lit. "dewy") hands": ψῆλόν μοι χερσὶ δροσιναῖς μύρον (*Epigr.* 3.3 Sider).

making: *fagina* ("beechen").[81] And Tibullus, who features cups prominently in the opening poems of each of his two collections, remembers Virgil's beech wood, and perhaps the bilingual *iunctura* of *facilis tornus* as well, in the last poem of his own first book, in a passage that recalls the opening verse (*divitias alius . . .*) of his own first elegy (1.10.7–8):[82]

divitis hoc vitium est auri, nec bella fuerunt,
faginus adstabat cum scyphus ante dapes.

This is the fault of rich gold, and there were no wars
when it was a beechen cup (σκύφος) that stood before banquets.

Where each of Virgil's beechen cups has a single portrait inside, the bowl of Theocritus' single cup is decorated with three separate scenes. A young woman is surrounded by two competing suitors, an old fisherman hauls his net over a rock, and a boy sits and weaves a cricket cage with rushes and asphodel (and art and delight) instead of guarding a vineyard and the food in his own knapsack from a pair of foxes: a poesis of love, a poesis of work, and a poesis of poesis.[83] Virgil clearly read the boy artisan inside Theocritus' cup as poetological allegoresis, since he applied the image to himself and his own poetic composition in the closing sphragis of the book of *Eclogues* (10.70–72):

haec sat erit, divae, vestrum cecinisse poetam
dum sedet et gracili fiscellam texit hibisco,
Pierides.

This will be enough, goddesses, for your poet to have sung,
while he sat and wove a rush-basket with slender mallow,
Muses.

Servius read this image as representing, *allegoricos* ("allegorically"), Virgil's own poetic composition.[84] Surely Tibullus read the lines allegorically as well: Roman poets knew how to read "pastoral analogies" in ways that some of our best recent critics of pastoral have been teaching us.[85] Virgil, then, ends the *Eclogues* with a reference to Theocritus' first *Idyll*. That reference points at the same time, intratextually, both to Menalcas' cup in *Eclogue* 3 and also, by the beechen material of that cup, to the opening of *Eclogue* 1, where Tityrus reclines under a spreading beech tree and meditates the Muse on his slender oaten pipe.[86] Virgil's bucolic book as a whole is thus in a sense "cupped" by this triplet of interlocking references, all of them pointing to Theocritus' mimesis (in words) of a carver's visual representation (in wood) of a boy's poetic fashioning (in wicker) that is itself an allegorical poesis of Theocritus' own poesis, and of Virgil's as well.

81. The only attested form before Virgil is *fagineus*; see Clausen 1994 ad loc.
82. Tibullus' other two instances of *pocula* are at 1.1.40 (to be discussed below) and 2.1.31. The poem on Messalinus' accession to the *quindecimviri* has a crowned *calix*, at 2.5.98.
83. Theoc. 1.32–54.
84. See Clausen 1994 ad loc.
85. Especially Gutzwiller 1991.
86. *Ecl.* 1.1: *Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi.*

One of the several possible aesthetic responses to these interlocking sequential chains of representation is to wonder aloud whether we haven't all by now heard enough arid parsings of "metapoetics" and "*mise en abîme*" in the criticism of literature. This modern vernacular response is not unmotivated: there are specific historical and cultural reasons why makings of makings might evoke, for us, the image of a vertiginous fall away from authenticity and into a nauseating void.[87] Start instead from the Peripatetic view that was both widespread in the Hellenistic Mediterranean and rooted in cultural common coin, and you arrive at precisely the opposite aesthetic response: the sequential process of composition appears as a rise not a fall. Matter, eternal and "always already informed" (Empson), tends with appetite toward higher levels of informedness, up to human intellection and divine contemplation.[88] The way up to understanding ("the mind is the form of forms") is through what poets do: making, the imposition of ever subtler forms on matter.[89]

Returning now to Poem 1.1, we can see that Tibullus, for his part, crafts an aesthetic response to his poetic tradition as instantiated in Theocritus and Virgil. He accomplishes this by placing his own mimesis of a cup's manufacture at his programmatic first poem's center (1.1.37–40):

adsitis, divi, neu vos e paupere mensa
  dona nec e puris spernite fictilibus:
fictilia antiquus primum sibi fecit agrestis
  pocula, de facili composuitque luto.

Be present, gods, and do not spurn gifts
from a poor table, from pure earthenware:
earthen were the cups a landsman of old first made
for himself, composing them out of "workable" clay.

The first couplet (1.37–40) situates offerings of food and libation at the end of a series of modest gifts made to divinities, of which the garland crown of wheat sheaves offered to Ceres is perhaps the most openly poetological.[90] As Annette Weiner has explained, the efficacy of a gift flows from its status as an "inalienable possession."[91] The crown I give to Ceres continues to be

87. The tenth book of the *Republic* is what leaps immediately to mind, but the reasons for this modern aversion probably have to do more with Christianity than with Plato. Lacan (1997, 119–23) is right to insist on the difference between ancient (Aristotelian) making from eternal matter and modern (Christian) creation *ex nihilo*.

88. "Doctrinal Point," Empson 2000, 59.

89. All informings count as makings on Aristotle's view. It is in this sense, I think, that Lacan (1997, 120) points to the "fallacious opposition between what is called concrete and what is called figurative." Compare Varro's etymology of *facere:* one who says "I make" (*facio*) "imposes a face" (*faciem imponit*) upon matter, just as one who says "I fashion" (*fingo*) imposes a "shape" (*figuram*). Varro *Ling.* 6.78; Maltby 1991, s.v. *facio*.

90. *Corona* ("crown," "garland") is the Latin for στέφανος, the name Meleager gave to his poetry "anthology." While Meleager's is a "song of all fruits" (i.e., the work of many poets, *Anth. Pal.* 4.1.1), Tibullus' is a "crown from my own farmland" (*nostro de rure corona,* 1.1.15). Meleager offers his crafted garland to Diocles as a "keepsake" (μναμόσυνον, *Anth. Pal.* 4.1.4), and Tibullus' poetry collection is implicitly offered as a gift to Messalla. The divine recipients of Tibullus' poetological emblems, then, allow for a reading of Poem 1.1 as implicitly divinizing Messalla (Poem 1.7 is arguably less implicit: see n. 14 above).

91. Weiner 1992.

my crown, because I made it and gave it, and the fact that Ceres possesses and wears a crown that continues to be mine binds us, god and mortal, relationally together. The "crown of song" that is a poem book binds its dedicatee and its poet in just this kind of relation, and it is for the ethical adequacy of his gift, and the efficacy of the relational bond it effects—between god and man, analogously between Tibullus and Messalla, ultimately between the poet and each reader—that the speaker of this couplet pleads.[92]

The second couplet quoted above (1.39–40) is the central "lathe" around which the entire poem turns. Nineteen couplets precede it, nineteen follow. Centers of Hellenistic and Roman poems often matter, and simple experiment with a word processor shows how easily an ancient edition could have signaled this poem's center to a reader, by setting its thirty-nine couplets in three columns of thirteen couplets each, all visible at once in a bookroll. Highlight this central couplet with even the subtlest mark (a single point at its center suffices) and the reader's eye is instantly drawn to the two verses, observes that they sit at the poem's exact midpoint, and later notes while reading that the immediately subsequent verse (*non ego divitias,* 1.1.41) begins the poem's second half by echoing the poem's incipit (*divitias alius,* 1.1.1). This umbilical couplet brings us back to the word under study. It is itself a word study, an etymology, whose presence is signaled by no fewer than three of the specific words that, as Francis Cairns has shown, Tibullus uses to mark his frequent etymologizing: *antiquus, primum, agrestis.*[93] The word whose manufacture Tibullus is about to trace is further marked by its couplet-initial position and by the resonant anadiplosis of the word, with polyptoton, across the previous couplet's boundary: *fictilibus/fictilia.* To the question of the origin of *fictilia,* Tibullus gives a twinned answer: one in the stuff of language (the word *facilis*) and one in the stuff of clay (the referent of the word *lutum*). Language keeps getting the poet's hands dirty in this poem, and "in handling . . . language," as the poet Geoffrey Hill has put it, "the poet makes an act of recognition that etymology is history."[94]

Tibullus' answer is more than twinned. His couplet's four corners give a startlingly full Aristotelian account of the fourfold modulation of single causation in the coming into being of those composite artifacts to which Tibullus gives the name *fictilia,* placed like a rubric at the couplet's initial, top left, corner. Insofar as *fictilia* are "vessels," their very name tells their "formal" cause, as most names of artifacts do ("chair," "toga"). But insofar as *fictilia* are so called because they are, etymologically, "made" (Tibullus takes the word as if from *facta,* "made things" rather than from *ficta,* "fashioned things"), their name points to their "efficient" cause: their maker. This primordial rustic artisan and Promethean "first inventor" (πρῶτος εὑρετής), though anonymous, seems almost to have inscribed his signature on the drying clay with the words *fecit agrestis,* at the couplet's top right. Next, insofar as *fictilia* are "cups" (*pocula*), they have come into being for the end

92. "Crown of song": Steiner 1986.
93. Cairns 1996.
94. Haffenden 1981, 88.

of drinking (*potio*), for mortal and divine lips alike, and thus the couplet's bottom left points to the "final" cause of these *fictilia . . . pocula*. Finally, insofar as *fictilia* are so called, semantically, because they are earthen or clayen, they have their "material" cause in the last word of the couplet, at the bottom right: *luto* ("clay").[95] Cup and clay, artifact and matter, thus frame the couplet as a whole. And so they should: to etymologize a word is always to name its linguistic "material" cause, by pointing to a simpler word in the language that constitutes the stuff of which the more complex word has been formed. This is one of the senses in which "etymology is history," and Tibullus has iconized this sense by encoding a poetic etymology of the naming word *fictilia* in words that give a historical account of the named thing's cause in matter.

This etymology is poetic for more reasons than the simple fact that it is "wrong"; Tibullus has made an anomaly of his language do poetic and philosophical work. *Fictilis* functions in Latin as an adjective of material, what Aristotle calls a "that-en" (ἐκείνινον) word because it means "made of *that*."[96] "That-en" words in Latin, as in Greek and English, regularly bear an etymological as well as a semantic relation to their corresponding "that" words: a *poculum* is *fagin(e)um* ("beechen") if made of *fagus* ("beech"), *aureum* ("golden") if made of *aurum* ("gold"), and so on. But *fictilis* ("clayen") lacks the etymological relation to the name of its corresponding "that" word, *lutum* ("clay," but also "mud"), and this for a simple historical linguistic reason. The adjective formed from *lutum* has already been "taken" for another semantic function: a *poculum luteum* is not a "clayen" cup but a "muddy" one. But analogy makes the language's speakers want to be able to say "made of clay" with a single adjective. Latin has accordingly supplied the missing "that-en" word in the form *fictilis,* a word that etymologically means "fashioned" (from *fingo, fictus*) but now, thanks to the suppletion, semantically means "clayen." Semantic analogy is thus achieved, but the suppletion has left an etymologically anomalous "that"/"that-en" pair. The cognate physical relation between "clay" and the "clayenness" of a cup made of clay, visible in English, has no analogous cognate relation in Latin: *lutum/fictilis*. It is precisely this linguistic relation that Tibullus has made the poetic function momentarily restore. By taking *fictilis* from *factus* ("made"), and by applying *facilis,* an adjectival form from the same verbal root, to the potter's clay, a poet has reawakened the analogy between origin in language (etymology) and origin in matter (history): clayen *pocula* are now *fictilia,* in Tibullus' revised etymology, because they are made of *facile lutum:* the "makeable" clay that images language itself, the poet's *materia poetica.*

A clayen cup has its material origin in workable clay, and by analogy the word *fictile* is given a new material origin in the letters of the word that names the clay's aptness to be worked: the word *facilis,* used here in the passive sense. And just as Tibullus' cups point back to Virgil's cups (and to Theocritus' cup as well), so Tibullus' *facile lutum* points back intratextually (and intertextually as well, by way of Virgil's *facilis tornus*) to the Tibullan

95. Arist. *Ph.* 2.3.194b16–195a3.
96. Arist. *Metaph.* Θ 7.1049a19; and discussion in M. L. Gill 1989, 151–55.

speaker's actively "making" hand (*facilis manus*) in the opening lines of Poem 1.1. Bringing Tibullus' *facilis manus* and *facile lutum* together invites us to note a further quirk of the Latin language. *Facilis* is a verbal adjective whose sense can be active as well as passive: "able to make" and "able to be made." Here again it can be suggested that Tibullus has made language do philosophy by means of poetry. "Proximate matter and the form," Aristotle teaches, "are one and the same, the one in potentiality, the other in actuality."[97] In the production of a cup, the potter's action of "making" (ποίησις) and the clay's "passion" (πάθησις) of being made are one change not two, just as "the road from Thebes to Athens and the road from Athens to Thebes are the same road."[98] This single process of change is relational, mutual, and reciprocal, because every changeable changer is changed by what it changes.[99] Hands and clay interact, then, like lovers. The potter's hands "suffer" too, at the "hands" of the clay. In the act of making a cup out of clay, hands realize an active potentiality (making a cup) and a passive potentiality (being made "makerly," through the practice of an art). By precisely the same process, clay realizes a passive potentiality (being made into a cup), and an active one as well: matter teaches the artisan's hands; it "forms" them (or "deforms" them, if the work is too hard or unfitted to the hands), and "forming" is simply another way of describing making. To say all of this is to name not four potentialities, nor two, but one. Ordinary language, however, in English just as in Tibullus' Latin and Aristotle's Greek, forces us to distinguish an active potentiality from a passive one. But Tibullus' precise intimacy with the thingness of language, with its stuffness, has shown him a way to mold words into an apter fit with things.[100] (That, in his tradition, is what poets do.) Take the two appearances of a single word in Poem 1.1 together, and *facilis* now gives a single name to the single potentiality that resides equally, and equally actively and passively at once, in both the maker's *facilis* hand and the *facilis* material that together engender the artifact.

5. CONCLUSION: WHAT MAKING DOES

If we move beyond this poem, there is more to be said about *facilis* and Roman elegy. In the diction of the genre, *facilis* programmatizes more than the materiality of poetic language. It is programmatic as well of love, the central thematic material to which erotic elegies give form. Being *facilis*—being apt stuff, or being able to make someone else into it—is a central elegiac way of talking about being a lover. This erotic meaning of *facilis,* used both actively and passively, is widespread enough that ancient readers probably sensed its underlying presence in the two instances of the word in Tibullus 1.1. Elsewhere Tibullus writes, for example, "I am ever *facilis* to tender Love" (*facilis tenero sum semper Amori,* 1.3.57) and "Hope swears to me that Nemesis will be *facilis,* but Nemesis says no" (*Spes facilem Nemesin spondet mihi, sed negat illa,* 2.2.6). The other elegists have comparable usages. Ovid, now putting

97. Arist. *Metaph.* H 1.1045b17–19.
98. Arist. *Ph.* 3.3.202b13–14.
99. Arist. *Ph.* 3.2.202a3–5.
100. Heidegger 1971.

the poetic form of elegy to a grander theme in the *Fasti*, remembers that elegiac distichs were "*faciles* assistants in love" (*faciles in amore ministros, Fast.* 2.6) to the young man he used to be. Love and the one I love are both "makeable" when they smile with favor. But Love is a handy artisan as well (a "poetic" conceit underlying the more common "ctetic" image of Love as a sharpshooter with the bow), and the one who loves is not only a maker but also material for the making.[101] Love as artisan potter and lover as stuff, clay on the wheel, were Hellenistic conceits apparently so commonplace that Propertius could activate both with the smallest indirect gesture, as in the pentameter of this couplet (Prop. 1.9.23–24):

nullus Amor cuiquam faciles ita praebuit alas
ut non alterna presserit ille manu.

Never has Love furnished a lover with *faciles* wings
without also pressing that lover with one hand then the other.

Tibullus found the way to bring together the two allegorical senses of the word *facilis,* poetic and erotic, in a single usage, and he placed that usage within the one openly programmatic statement about poetry to be found in his two elegiac books.[102] Poem 2.4, the elegy that contains this statement, begins on a bitter cry of farewell to *libertas*.[103] What follows that cry can easily be read, if a reader is so inclined (and not if not), as political poetry clothed in the thin veil of an elegiac lover's stance as Love's slave. Like the poem that precedes it, to form the central pair within a collection of six, Poem 2.4 might be said to give voice to aristocratic *ressentiment* of a kind and in a mode that extant Roman literature does not show us again until Lucan.

In the passage below, three verses (2.4.16–18) carry a traditional programmatic message in the form of a so-called *recusatio:* the poet who follows Callimachus and Theocritus must recuse himself from writing in genres grander than his own slender mode.[104] Virgil and Horace, as well as Propertius and Ovid, have each left us one or more elaborate examples of the topos. But Tibullus' *recusatio,* unlike theirs, does not resolve itself into a reaffirmation of the poem's generic identity and the poet's aesthetic allegiance. Instead, it is framed between a wholesale rejection of the poetic and the dire vision of a world in which poetry has no place. This darkest moment in Tibullus shrilly unwrites Poem 1.1's ethical selection of what poets do, in favor of some redder handiwork of the "getting" kind (2.4.11–26):

nunc et amara dies et noctis amarior umbra est,
omnia nunc tristi tempora felle madent.
nec prosunt elegi nec carminis auctor Apollo:
illa cava pretium flagitat usque manu.
ite procul, Musae, si non prodestis amanti: 15

101. Tibullus makes Love an artist of the bow at 2.1.69–70 and 2.5.107–8.
102. Bulloch (1973, 71) adds that Tibullus also mentions his own poetic production at 2.5.111–12.
103. Tib. 2.4.1–2: *sic mihi servitium video dominamque paratam: / iam mihi libertas illa paterna vale.*
104. On Callimachus and the Roman poet's *recusatio,* Wimmel 1960. On Theocritus' complex relation to Homeric poetry, see Van Sickle 1976; Halperin 1983; and Hunter 1996, 90–97.

non ego vos, ut sint bella canenda, colo,
nec refero Solisque vias et qualis, ubi orbem
complevit, versis Luna recurrit equis.
ad dominam faciles aditus per carmina quaero:
ite procul, Musae, si nihil ista valent.
at mihi per caedem et facinus sunt dona paranda,
ne iaceam clausam flebilis ante domum,
aut rapiam suspensa sacris insignia fanis,
sed Venus ante alios est violanda mihi:
illa malum facinus suadet dominamque rapacem
dat mihi: sacrilegas sentiat illa manus.

Bitter now is daylight, bitterer still night's shade;
no hour but drips with carking bile.
Elegy's no good. Apollo, lord of poetry: no good.
What *she* wants is goods, and stretches out an empty hand's demand, again, again.
Away with you, Muses, if you're no good for a lover.
My aim in worshiping you is not to have wars to sing.
My subject is not the sun's elliptic path
or the face of the moon when, her orbit complete,
she wheels her horses around and brings them galloping back.
What I seek through poetry is some "easy" way in to my mistress.
Away with you, Muses, if poems are of no value here.
No: it's by slaughter and crime that I must get gifts,
so I can stop lying vanquished, weeping, in front of a shut home.
Or let me tear the hanging images down from temple walls.
But it's Venus above all I must despoil and rape.
She's the one who counsels crime and gives me a greedy mistress:
she's the one who ought to feel my desecrating hands.

The *aditus* ("entries") sought by the speaker are *faciles* partly because they are erotic: paraclausithyron, the lover's complaint before a locked door, always figures a plea for "entry" into *gaudium* (*jouissance*). Yet these "ways in" are also *faciles* because accomplished through the power of poetry and so "poetic": Tibullus has explicitly glossed this sense of the adjective with the words *per carmina* ("through poems"). But now, staring into the nothing at the center of his own art, he seems to declare that the made artifacts that are his poems have lost all their former currency as gifts and all the ethical adequacy of their authentic thingness: *nihil ista valent* ("they are of no value"). And raging, in self-loathing threats as powerless as poetry itself against a world where ancient privilege goes trampled underfoot while freedmen enriched by booty and preferments live like kings (2.3.63–64), the speaker of Tibullus' second book proclaims, by a new etymological modulation of history, the denaturing and degeneration of the aristocratic order that formerly valorized both his poems and the poet who made them: hands are now for getting by sacrilegious violence, not for making by poetic art, because *faciles aditus* can only yield precedence, have already given way, to the "making" or "doing" of *facinus* ("crime").

The passage as a whole veers affectively toward a kind of baroque "sublime of self-disgust" (think of Lucan again), by its exalted and fascinated

horror in the contemplation of an ascending series of images of abject humiliation and desacralizing violation, both physical and ethical.[105] And yet, strangely enough, much of Tibullus' thematic material here is fully characteristic of its author and genre, and fully traditional: the opening couplet's lament suggests a reminiscence of Philitas, and complaining of a greedy mistress is as widespread a commonplace in Hellenistic poetry as the programmatic rejection of hexametric grandeur.[106] The thematic and dictional conservatism of his poetic instrument, the receivedness of the stuff in which the speaker's affect is coded, seems in fact to complicate rather than diminish the force of that affect's expression. Elegy turns murderous and suicidal for a moment, yet it does so without losing the dictional elegance and laborious sweetness that characterizes it as a genre of poetic utterance. Or rather, elegy *threatens* to turn murderous and suicidal: a threat that, precisely by a hyperbolic and self-reflexive outrageousness that refuses to be taken entirely seriously, points toward the speaker's claim to inhabit, still and in spite of everything, an ethical order in which the wrongs he has suffered both merit and can compellingly demand recognition and redress.[107] To say even this much is already to make a political claim. If it is made more discreetly than openly, it is nonethess articulated, spoken not mute. It is a claim whose articulation Tibullus achieves in a way that invites us, as students of Roman elegy and more broadly as readers of poetry, to rethink how issues of literary history, and issues of political history as well, get played out in the represented affects of individual poets. As Charles Altieri puts it:

> How affects get structured is a very good index of how historical and social pressures affect our intimate relations to ourselves. And stressing affects affords a theater where we can readily notice what is involved in authors' labors to push back against those pressures. The history in question is a complex one, difficult to fix in any linear narrative. For affects are conservative phenomena, persisting or modifying only slightly even when there are substantial changes in dominant ideologies. One might say that in most cases people try to get by with inherited attitudes toward the affects even when they repudiate or change much of their heritage. Yet the more conservative the instrument, the greater the role for the imaginative energies art brings to bear. The aesthetic domain is a relatively safe one within which to experiment with what it might be like to shift the kinds of investments of psychological economies that typically govern affective lives. Artists explore how there can be new orientations toward the affects that may make us more responsive to historical change, either embracing it or seeking distance from its impact. And artistic media provide subtle and intimate instruments for registering and recasting what the psyche has available for engaging that history as intensely as possible.[108]

The last three couplets quoted above seem to me to engage history more intensely than Tibullus is generally allowed to have done on modern

105. "Sublime of self-disgust": Altieri 1998, 257–82. On this aspect of Lucan, see Bartsch 1997. On baroque vertigo, see Stewart 2002, 178–95.

106. Philitas: *H. Dem.* frag. 9 Spanoudakis = *Coll. Alex.* 1.

107. Lacan (1997, 107) seems to have something similar in mind when he complains that in certain kinds of psychoanalytic criticism of art, "[c]ompletely left out is something that must always be emphasized in artistic production and something that Freud paradoxically insisted on, to the surprise of many writers, namely, social recognition."

108. Altieri, forthcoming.

readings.[109] They convey images and enact affects of a violence that neither Tibullus' own poetic practice nor the generic conventions of elegy as we know them will have prepared a reader to expect. I find it hard not to think of this thematic material as registering on some level a psychic reflex of (but also a pushing back against) lived historical and political experience, at least in the sense that it records and responds to actions of a kind that Tibullus and his contemporary readers had either witnessed themselves, on Italian soil, or knew through the narrated memories of living witnesses. These actions belonged to historical events of the recent past whose political consequences were still being lived out.

Tibullus was a young child when the civil war that had begun at the Rubicon culminated in Caesar's victory over Pompey at Pharsalus. He was a young man when another bloody victory of Romans over Romans, at Philippi (a name that Virgil's poetic conflation had already made into Pharsalus' uncanny double), raised up Octavian as the *divi filius,* "son of the deified."[110] In Poem 1.1, many readers find a hint that Tibullus' own family's holdings had been reduced in the confiscations of Italian land that followed on that victory. Finally, Tibullus' adult life and poetic maturity coincided with Actium and its aftermath: an end to civil strife (in the form of open warfare) and a beginning of the leveling process that accompanied the passage from an aristocratic organization of society to a monarchical one. Given this broad context of lived history, the kinds of political opinions implicitly voiced, with explicit bitterness, by the speaker of Poem 2.4—only a great fortune now ennobles and brings the prestige that grants an "easy way in," and only sacrilegious bloodshed, or complicity in it, buys a great fortune—represent opinions that individual equestrians and senators of Tibullus' generation can easily be imagined to have held. And precisely because opinions of this kind expressed in this way are predicated on an aristocratic organization of society—based, that is, on a political ideology that we tend to find not so much contemptible as invisible—we tend not to recognize them as carrying political import.[111]

If senatorial and equestrian Romans after Actium knew more than they said, it remains that they said far more than is known to us, both where we have their words and where we do not. During the same years in which Tibullus worked, Asinius Pollio, for example, was composing a history of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey in seventeen books, all now lost. Horace, who seems to have issued a friend's gentle warning to both writers, made his warning more explicit in Pollio's more egregious case: writing history is a dangerous business when live embers are still glowing beneath history's dead ash.[112] We are hard pressed to say precisely what dangerous assertions Pollio's history may have contained. We do know that Pollio, though never forswearing his personal loyalty to Julius Caesar, was never

109. Tibullus and history: see most recently Classen 2002, 1–5.

110. *G.* 1.490: *Romanas acies iterum videre Philippi.*

111. Instructive remarks on aristocracy from an anthropological perspective in Godelier 1999, 73–75 and 157–61.

112. To Pollio: Hor. *Carm.* 2.1; to Tibullus: Hor. *Epist.* 1.4.

fully reconciled to his great friend's adoptive son. Certainly no political etiquette in the modern style ("Caesarian," "anti-Augustan"), and probably no notion of the political as we understand it, can adequately capture the complexity of Pollio's stance in relation to his historical moment. But when we point out that fact, we are not pointing to a breakdown in the Roman sign system's power to represent historical and political realities. We are pointing to a breakdown in the analogy between ancient and modern notions of the political. In Pollio's case it could even be said that, so long as the *princeps* preferred to counsel rather than command, the aristocratic tradition of Roman *dicacitas* ("outspoken wit") evidently still had enough signifying force of its own to put imperial power itself on the defensive: think of Pollio's immortal *si iubes, Caesar.*[113] Similarly, it is rash to suppose that Tibullus' poetic language is pointing toward something that escapes signification whenever it frames something that escapes our present understanding.

In saying that and showing it by example, I hope to have done more than make the obvious point that our own historical situatedness continues to condition our understanding of Tibullus' poetry and our understanding of its relation to its ancient political, historical, ethical, and poetic contexts. I want to say as well that we possess, and continue to acquire, significant means of revising and refining that understanding, if we are willing to read with the kind of provisional sympathy that keeps us open to the possibility of new understanding. It is true that the project of reading *against* literature, resisting it to diagnose its blindnesses, will remain an important and necessary critical task wherever canonical texts, like canonical versions of history, are held up as possessing a normative force entirely independent of their historical and social embeddedness. It is also true that linguistic signs are always and inevitably both too shallow and too capacious for their referents, so that signifier and signified must always exceed and be exceeded mutually, and every interpretation can always be shown to be inadequate in some places and irrelevant in others. But if we define the "Real" as that which escapes every kind of signification including the aesthetic, we evacuate too much of the stuffness of signs and too much of the critical potential of art. And if we are content to say of an individual poetic text that it, or its author, has swooned out into that "Real" wherever the philological and critical apparatus of our elders failed to arrive at a satisfying construction of the text's sense, then we have simply left close reading in the hands of the canon builders of another era—presumably either on the assumption that they were better at it than we may ever hope to be, or else on the assumption that they left nothing undone that could ever be accomplished by reading ancient poems as if their language had something new to say. Reading for difficulty, with the fullest possible contextualization and with provisional openness to, and appetite for, the possibility of new solutions, has the advantage of allowing the text to resist our reading and show up our own blindnesses, by throw-

113. Timagenes, banished from Augustus' table and home for his insulting wit, had found a new host in Asinius Pollio. To Augustus' peeved remark—θηριοτρεφεῖς ("you are nursing a beast")—Pollio answered that he would of course turn Timagenes out of his house, "if you command it, Caesar" (Sen. *Ira* 3.23.4–8). Caesar did not command it.

ing a light on something irreducibly foreign in an ancient poet that we had not previously been able to see. And this is a place where specialists in Roman poetry continue to have significant contributions to make to literary studies and to the academic humanities at the broadest level.[114]

University of Chicago

114. This article is dedicated to Paul Allen Miller, in token of friendship and in gratitude for his generous help with an essay that takes issue with some of his own positions. I am grateful as well to James Chandler and the Franke Institute for the Humanities at the University of Chicago, where as a fellow I found the leisure to write too many words about a "terse and elegant" poet, and to Shadi Bartsch, Peter White, and *CP*'s anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions.

LITERATURE CITED

Adams, H. 1991. The Difficulty of Difficulty. In *The Idea of Difficulty in Literature,* ed. A. C. Purves, 23–50. Albany.

Alpers, P. 1996. *What Is Pastoral?* Chicago.

Altieri, C. 1998. *Postmodernisms Now: Essays on Contemporaneity in the Arts.* University Park, Pa.

_____. Forthcoming. Reading for Affect in the Lyric: From Modern to Contemporary. To be published in *Poetry and Pedagogy: The Challenge of the Contemporary,* ed. J. Retallack and J. Spahr.

Annas, J. 1992. Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality. *Philosophical Perspectives* 6:119–36.

_____. 1993. *The Morality of Happiness.* New York.

Ball, R. 1983. *Tibullus the Elegist: A Critical Survey.* Hypomnemata, 77. Göttingen.

Barnes, J. 1997. Roman Aristotle. In *Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome,* ed. J. Barnes and M. Griffin, 1–69. Oxford.

Bartsch, S. 1997. *Ideology in Cold Blood: A Reading of Lucan's* Civil War. Cambridge, Mass.

Benveniste, E. 1966. Remarques sur la fonction du langage dans la découverte freudienne. In *Problèmes de linguistique générale,* vol. 1, 75–87. Paris. Originally published in *La Psychanalyse* (Paris, 1956).

Bidart, F. 2002. *Music Like Dirt.* Louisville, Ky.

Boyd, B. W. 1984. *Parva seges satis est:* The Landscape of Tibullan Elegy in 1.1 and 1.10. *TAPA* 114:273–80.

Bradley, K. 1994. *Slavery and Society at Rome.* Cambridge.

Bright, D. F. 1978. Haec mihi fingebam: *Tibullus in His World.* Leiden.

Brown, B. 2002. The Tyranny of Things (Trivia in Karl Marx and Mark Twain). *Critical Inquiry* 28:442–69.

Bulloch, A. W. 1973. Tibullus and the Alexandrians. *PCPS* 19:71–89.

Burford, A. 1972. *Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society.* Ithaca.

Burke, K. 1969. *A Grammar of Motives.* Berkeley.

Cairns, F. 1979. *Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome.* Cambridge.

_____. 1996. Ancient "Etymologies" and Tibullus: On the Classification of "Etymologies" and on "Etymological Markers." *PCPS* 42:24–59.

Classen, C. J. 2002. Clio Exclusa. In *Clio and the Poets: Augustan Poetry and the Traditions of Ancient Historiography,* ed. D. S. Levene and D. P. Nelis, 1–24. Leiden.

Clausen, W. 1994. *Virgil:* Eclogues. Oxford.

Coleman, R. 1977. *Vergil:* Eclogues. Cambridge.

Doniger [O'Flaherty], W. 1981. *The Rig Veda: An Anthology.* London.

Edwards, C. 1993. *The Politics of Immorality in Ancient Rome.* Cambridge.

Elder, J. P. 1962. Tibullus: *Tersus atque Elegans.* In *Critical Essays on Roman Literature: Elegy and Lyric,* ed. J. P. Sullivan, 65–105. London.

Empson, W. 1966. *Seven Types of Ambiguity.* New York. Originally published London, 1930.

_____. 1974. *Some Versions of Pastoral.* New York. Originally published London, 1935.

_____. 2000. *The Complete Poems.* Ed. J. Haffenden. London.

Erikson, E. 1958. *Young Man Luther: A Study of Psychoanalysis and History.* New York.

Faber, R. 1995. Vergil *Eclogue* 3.37, Theocritus 1, Hellenistic Ekphrasis. *AJP* 116:411–17.

Fantham, E. 1991. *Stuprum*: Public Attitudes and Penalties for Sexual Offences in Republican Rome. *EMC* 35:267–91.

Freud, S. 1958. The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part). In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* trans. J. Strachey, vol. 4. London. Originally published as *Die Traumdeutung* (Leipzig and Vienna, 1900).

Gill, C. 1988. Personhood and Personality: The Four-*Personae* Theory in Cicero, *De Officiis* I. *OSAP* 6:169–99.

Gill, M. L. 1989. *Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity.* Princeton.

Gleason, M. 1995. *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome.* Princeton.

Godelier, M. 1999. *The Enigma of the Gift.* Trans. N. Scott. Chicago.

Gold, B. 1987. *Literary Patronage in Greece and Rome.* Chapel Hill.

Gutzwiller, K. 1991. *Theocritus' Pastoral Analogies: The Formation of a Genre.* Madison.

Haffenden, J. 1981. *Viewpoints: Poets in Conversation with John Haffenden.* London.

Halperin, D. 1983. *Before Pastoral: Theocritus and the Ancient Tradition of Bucolic Poetry.* New Haven.

Heidegger, M. 1971. The Thing. In *Poetry, Language, Thought,* trans. A. Hofstadter, 165–82. New York.

Hollander, J. 1997. *The Work of Poetry.* New York.

Hunter, R. 1996. *Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry.* Cambridge.

Jakobson, R. 1990. Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances. In *On Language: Roman Jakobson,* ed. L. R. Waugh and M. Monville-Burston, 115–40. Cambridge, Mass. Originally published in *Fundamentals of Language,* by R. Jakobson and M. Halle (The Hague, 1956), 49–73.

Jameson, F. 1981. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative As a Socially Symbolic Act.* Ithaca.

Johnson, S. 1983. From *The Life of Milton.* In *Milton's "Lycidas": The Tradition and the Poem,* ed. C. A. Patrides, 60–61. Rev. ed. Columbia, Mo.

Johnson, W. R. 1990. Messalla's Birthday: The Politics of Pastoral. *Arethusa* 23:95–113.

Kaufman, R. 2000. Red Kant, or The Persistence of the Third *Critique* in Adorno and Jameson. *Critical Inquiry* 26:682–724.

Kennedy, D. 1993. *The Arts of Love: Five Studies in the Discourse of Roman Love Elegy.* Cambridge.

Koenen, L. 1976. Egyptian Influence in Tibullus. *ICS* 1:127–59.

Krauss, R. 1993. *The Optical Unconscious.* Cambridge, Mass.

Lacan, J. 1977. The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud. In *Écrits: A Selection,* trans. A. Sheridan, 146–78. New York. Originally published as L'Instance de la lettre dans l'inconscient, in *Écrits I* (Paris, 1966), 249–89.

_____. 1997. *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–1960.* Trans. D. Porter. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 7, ed. J.-A. Miller. New York.

Larmore, C. 1996. *The Morals of Modernity.* Cambridge.

Leach, E. W. 1978. Vergil, Horace, Tibullus: Three Collections of Ten. *Ramus* 7:79–105.

_____. 1980a. Poetics and Poetic Design in Tibullus' First Elegiac Book. *Arethusa* 13:79–96.

_____. 1980b. Sacral-Idyllic Landscape Painting and the Poems of Tibullus' First Book. *Latomus* 39:47–69.

Lear, J. 1988. *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand.* Cambridge.

Lee, G. 1974. *Otium cum indignitate*: Tibullus 1.1. In *Quality and Pleasure in Latin Poetry,* ed. T. Woodman and D. West, 94–114. Cambridge.
_____. 1982. *Tibullus: Elegies*. Leeds.
Lee-Stecum, P. 1998. *Powerplay in Tibullus: Reading Elegies Book One*. Cambridge.
Leumann, M. 1917. *Die lateinischen Adjektiva auf* -lis. Strasburg.
Long, A. A. 1996. *Stoic Studies*. Cambridge.
Lyne, R. O. A. M. 1980. *The Latin Love Poets: From Catullus to Ovid*. Oxford.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. South Bend.
Maltby, R. 1991. *A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies*. Leeds.
Miller, P. A. 1999. The Tibullan Dream Text. *TAPA* 129:181–224.
Moisseeff, M. 1994. Les Objets cultuels aborigènes ou comment représenter l'irreprésentable. *Genèses* 17:8–32.
Morris, E. P. 1967. *Horace:* Satires *and* Epistles. Norman, Okla.
Murgatroyd, P. 1975. *Militia amoris* and the Roman Elegists. *Latomus* 34:59–79.
_____. 1980. *Tibullus I: A Commentary on the First Book of the Elegies of Albius Tibullus*. Pietermaritzburg.
Mutschler, F.-H. 1985. *Die poetische Kunst Tibulls: Struktur und Bedeutung der Bücher 1 und 2 des Corpus Tibullianum*. Frankfurt am Main.
Nash, D. 1976. Reconsidering Poseidonius' Celtic Ethnography: Some Considerations. *Britannia* 7:111–26.
Page, T. E., ed. 1895. *P. Vergili Maronis:* Bucolica, Georgica, Aeneis. London.
Phang, S. E. 2003. *Disciplina militaris:* Constructing Gender in the Roman Army. Paper read at the 134th annual meeting of the American Philological Association.
Putnam, M. C. J. 1970. Simple Tibullus and the Ruse of Style. *Yale French Studies* 45:21–32. Later published in *Essays on Latin Lyric, Elegy, and Epic* (Princeton, 1982), 163–74.
_____. 1973. *Tibullus: A Commentary*. Norman, Okla.
Rawlings, L. 1998. Caesar's Portrayal of Gauls As Warriors. In *Julius Caesar As Artful Performer: The War Commentaries As Political Instruments,* ed. K. Welch and A. Powell, 171–92. London.
Rawson, E. 1985. *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic*. Baltimore.
Richlin, A. 1992. *The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and Aggression in Roman Humor*. Rev. ed. New York.
Riposati, B. 1945. *Introduzione allo studio di Tibullo*. Milan.
Rosenmeyer, T. G. 1969. *The Green Cabinet: Theocritus and the European Pastoral Lyric*. Berkeley.
Roudinesco, E. 1997. *Jacques Lacan*. Trans. B. Bray. NewYork.
Saller, R. 1982. *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*. Cambridge.
Schneewind, J. B. 1996. Kant and Stoic Ethics. In *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics,* ed. S. Engstrom and J. Whiting, 285–301. Cambridge.
Seiler, M. A. 1997. Ποίησις ποιήσεως: *Alexandrinische Dichtung* κατὰ λεπτόν *in strukturaler und humanethologischer Dichtung*. Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 102. Stuttgart.
Selden, D. 1998. Alibis. *ClAnt* 17:289–412.
Sider, D. 1997. *The Epigrams of Philodemos: Introduction, Text and Commentary*. Oxford.
Smith, K. F. 1913. *The Elegies of Albius Tibullus*. New York.
Snell, B. 1953. *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought*. Trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer. Oxford.
Spanoudakis, K. 2002. *Philitas of Cos*. Mnemosyne Suppl. 229. Leiden.
Steidle, W. 1962. Das Motiv der Lebenswahl bei Tibull und Properz. *WS* 75:100–140.
Steiner, D. 1986. *The Crown of Song: Metaphor in Pindar*. New York.
Stewart, S. 2002. *Poetry and the Fate of the Senses*. Chicago.
Tierney, J. J. 1960. The Celtic Ethnography of Posidonius. *PRIA* 60:189–275.

Tiffany, D. 2000. *Toy Medium: Materialism and Modern Lyric.* Berkeley.

Touponce, W. 1991. Literary Theory and the Notion of Difficulty. In *The Idea of Difficulty in Literature,* ed. A. C. Purves, 51–71. Albany.

Van Sickle, J. 1976. Theocritus and the Development of the Conception of Bucolic Genre. *Ramus* 5:18–44.

Wageningen, J. van. 1913. Tibulls sogennante Träumereien. *NJbb* 31:350–55.

Watkins, C. 1990. What is Philology? In *On Philology,* ed. J. Ziolkowski (Special Issue of *Comparative Literature Studies* 27), 21–25. University Park, Pa.

Weiner, A. 1992. *Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving.* Berkeley.

White, P. 1993. *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome.* Cambridge, Mass.

Williams, B. 1985. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.* Cambridge, Mass.

Williams, C. 1999. *Roman Homosexuality: Ideologies of Masculinity in Classical Antiquity.* Oxford.

Williams, R. 1973. *The Country and the City.* London.

Wimmel, W. 1960. *Kallimachos in Rom: Die Nachfolge seines apologetischen Dichtens in der Augusteerzeit.* Hermes Einzelschriften, 16. Wiesbaden.

_____. 1976. *Tibull und Delia.* Erster Teil, *Tibullus Elegie 1,1.* Hermes Einzelschriften, 37. Wiesbaden.

Wray, D. 2001. *Catullus and the Poetics of Roman Manhood.* Cambridge.

Žižek, S. 1991. *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As a Political Factor.* London.

Zumthor, P. 1982. On the Circularity of Song. In *French Literary Theory Today: A Reader,* ed. T. Todorov, trans. R. Carter, 179–91. Cambridge.